Dewey on Science, Arts and Greek Philosophy

John Dewey claimed that modern science has entailed “a generalized . . . adoption of the point of view of the useful arts”—combined, however, with a confused dissociation of science from art. He associated this with a latent allegiance to classical traditions that emphasize fixity, and this, in turn, with the persistence of certain sceptical trends. Some, for example, designate the everyday world of change as merely apparent, equating reality to fixed laws and mathematical certainties. That we can know reality by discovering laws and suchlike is meant to bring consolation, but it does not lessen the invitation to mistrust firsthand experience. Others grant that reality is in transition. They add, however, that we cannot think coherently and build bodies of knowledge without fixing concepts to some extent, making knowledge a perversion of reality. According to Dewey, the first of these outlooks fails to recognize that laws do not express “any matter of fact existence.” Rather, “their ultimate implication is application; they are methods and when applied as methods they regulate the precarious flow of unique situations.” The second view similarly fails to recognize that concepts are not principally representations of reality, but instruments through which we cognitively and physically interact with reality, rearranging it in such ways that it becomes more intelligible. This paper considers Dewey’s efforts to understand science in terms of both the practical and fine arts, and his attempts to alleviate sceptical trends by doing so. Dewey drew liberally from ancient Greek philosophy, and I also spend some time discussing how his philosophy of art and science suggest that Plato and Aristotle correctly identified conditions under which things become knowable, even though they did not satisfactorily answer how these conditions can be met.